Phrenology and physiognomy.

— Phrenology is the science that deals with the functions attributed to each part of the brain. Dr. Gall, the founder of this science, thought that, since the brain is the point toward which all sensations are conducted, and from which proceed all the manifestations of the intellectual and moral faculties, each of the primitive faculties ought to have its own special organ there. Thus, his system consists in the localization of the faculties. The development of each cerebral part being determined by the development of the bony skullcap, producing protuberances, he concluded that, from the examination of these protuberances, one could deduce the predominance of this or that faculty and, from that, the character or the aptitudes of the individual. Hence, also, the name craniscopy given to this science, with the difference that phrenology has as its object all that concerns the attributions of the brain, while craniscopy is limited to the inferences drawn from the inspection of the skull. In a word, Gall did, with respect to the skull and the brain, what Lavater did for the physiognomic features.

There is no reason to discuss here the merit of this science, nor to examine whether it is true or exaggerated in all its consequences. But it has been, by turns, defended and criticized by men of high scientific value. If certain details are still hypothetical, it nonetheless rests upon an incontestable principle, that of the general functions of the brain, and upon the relations existing between the development or the atrophy of this organ and the intellectual manifestations. Our aim is the study of its psychological consequences.

From the relations existing between the development of the brain and the manifestation of certain faculties, some learned men concluded that the cerebral organs are the very source of the faculties, a doctrine that is none other than that of materialism, for it tends to the negation of the intelligent principle foreign to matter. Consequently, it makes of man a machine, without free will and without responsibility for his acts, since he could always attribute his errors to his organization and it would be an injustice to punish him for faults that it would not have depended on him to commit. We are shaken by the consequences of such a theory, and with reason. Ought phrenology, for that, to be proscribed? No, but to examine what there might be in it of true or of false in the manner of regarding the facts. Now, this examination proves that the attributions of the brain in general, and even the localization of the faculties, can be perfectly reconciled with the most severe spiritualism, which would find therein the explanation of certain facts. Let us admit, for an instant, by way of hypothesis, the existence of a special organ for the musical instinct. Let us suppose, moreover, as the Spiritist Doctrine teaches us, that a Spirit, whose existence is far anterior to its body, reincarnates with the musical faculty very developed; this will naturally be exercised upon the corresponding organ and will stimulate its development, as the exercise of a limb increases the volume of the muscles. As in childhood the bony system offers little resistance, the skull undergoes the influence of the expansive movement of the cerebral mass. In this way, the development of the skull is produced by the development of the brain, just as the development of the brain is produced by that of the faculty. The faculty is the first cause; the state of the brain is a consecutive effect. Without the faculty the organ would not exist or would be only rudimentary. Regarded from this point of view, phrenology, as one sees, has nothing contrary to morality, for it leaves to man all his responsibility, it remaining for us to add that this theory is, at the same time, conformable to logic and to the observation of the facts. They object with the well-known cases in which the influence of the organism upon the manifestation of the faculties is incontestable, such as those of madness and idiocy, but it is easy to resolve the question. One sees every day very intelligent men become mad. What does this prove? A very strong man may break his leg and will no longer be able to walk. Now, the will to walk is not in the leg, but in the brain; this will is only paralyzed by the impossibility of moving the leg. In the madman, the organ that served the manifestations of thought, being damaged by some physical cause, the thought can no longer manifest itself in a regular manner; it wanders this way and that, doing what we call extravagances. But it nonetheless continues to exist in its integrity, and the proof of this is that, if the organ is restored, the original thought returns, like the movement of the leg that is cured. Thus, thought is not in the brain, just as it is not found in the cranial cap. The brain is the instrument of thought, as the eye is the instrument of vision, and the skull is the solid surface that molds itself to the movements of the instrument. If the instrument is deteriorated, no manifestation will occur, exactly as one can no longer see upon losing an eye.

Nevertheless, it sometimes happens that the suspension of the free manifestation of thought is not due to an accidental cause, as in madness. The primitive constitution of the organs may offer to the Spirit, from birth, an obstacle over which its activity cannot triumph. This is what happens when the organs are atrophied or present an insuperable resistance. Such is the case of idiocy. The Spirit is as though imprisoned and suffers this constriction, but it nonetheless continues to think as a Spirit, in the same way as a prisoner behind bars. The study of the manifestations of the Spirit of living persons, through evocation, casts a great light upon the psychological phenomena. By isolating the Spirit from matter, it is proved by facts that the organs are not the cause of the faculties, but mere instruments, with the aid of which the faculties manifest themselves with greater or lesser freedom or precision; that they often function as mufflers, which deaden the manifestations, which explains the greater freedom of the Spirit, once detached from matter.

In the materialist conception, what is an idiot? Nothing; he is merely a human being. According to the Spiritist Doctrine he is a being endowed with reason like everyone, but infirm from birth in the brain, as others are in the limbs. In rehabilitating him, will not such a doctrine be more moral, more humane, than the one that makes of him a contemptible being? Is it not more consoling for a father, who has the misfortune of having such a son, to think that this imperfect envelope encloses a soul that thinks?

To those who, without being materialists, do not admit the plurality of existences, we shall ask: What is the soul of the idiot? If the soul is formed at the same time as the body, why would God create beings so wretched? What will be their future? Admit, on the contrary, a succession of existences and everything is explained in conformity with justice: idiocy may be a punishment or a trial and, in any case, it is but an incident in the life of the Spirit. Is this not greater, more worthy of the justice of God, than to suppose that the Father created a being forever failed?

— Now let us cast our eyes upon physiognomy. This science is based on the incontestable principle that it is thought that sets the organs in play, that imprints upon the muscles certain movements. From this it follows that, by studying the relations between the apparent movements and the thought, from the movements seen we can deduce the thought, which we do not see. It is thus that we shall not be mistaken as to the intention of one who makes a threatening or a friendly gesture; that we shall recognize the gait of a man in a hurry and that of one who is not. Of all the muscles, the most mobile are those of the face; there are often reflected even the most delicate nuances of thought. This is why, with reason, it is said that the face is the mirror of the soul. By the frequency of certain sensations, the muscles contract the habit of the corresponding movements and end by forming the wrinkle. The exterior form is thus modified by the impressions of the soul, whence it follows that, from this form, one can sometimes deduce these impressions, as from the gesture we can deduce the thought. Such is the general principle of the art or, if one prefers, of the physiognomic science. This principle is true; not only does it rest upon a rational basis, but it is confirmed by observation, Lavater having the glory, if not of having discovered it, at least of having developed it and formulated it into a body of doctrine. Unfortunately, Lavater fell into the error common to most authors of systems, that is, starting from a principle true in certain respects, to conclude with a universal application and, in their enthusiasm at having discovered a truth, to see it everywhere. Therein lies the exaggeration and, often, the ridiculous. It is not for us to examine here the system of Lavater in its details: we shall say only that he is as consistent in ascending from the physical to the moral by certain exterior signs, as he is illogical in attributing some meaning to forms or signs upon which thought can exercise no action. It is the false application of a true principle that often relegates it to the level of superstitious beliefs, and that leads to confounding in the same reprobation those who see correctly and those who exaggerate. Let us say, nevertheless, to be just, that often the fault is less that of the master than of the disciples who, in their fanatical and unreflective admiration, sometimes carry the consequences of a principle beyond the limits of the possible.

— Now, if we examine this science in its relations with Spiritism, we shall have to combat several erroneous inferences that might be drawn from it. Among the physiognomic relations, there is principally one upon which the imagination has often exercised itself: it is the resemblance of some persons to certain animals. Let us seek, then, to discover the cause.

The physical resemblance between relatives results from the consanguinity that transmits, from one to the other, similar organic particles, because the body proceeds from the body. But it could not enter into anyone's thought to suppose that he who resembles a cat, for example, has in his veins the blood of a cat. There is, therefore, another cause. At the outset, it may be fortuitous and without any significance: this is the most common case. However, besides the physical resemblance, one sometimes notes a certain analogy of inclinations. This could be explained by the same cause that modifies the features of the physiognomy. If a Spirit still backward retains some of the instincts of the animal, his character, as a man, will have these traits, and the passions that agitate him may give to these traits something that vaguely recalls those of the animal whose instincts he possesses. But these traits efface themselves to the measure that the Spirit purifies itself and the man advances on the path of perfection.

Here, then, it would be the Spirit that imprints its mark upon the physiognomy; but from the similitude of the instincts it would be absurd to conclude that the man who has those of the cat could be the incarnation of the Spirit of a cat. Far from teaching such a theory, Spiritism has always demonstrated its ridiculousness and its impossibility. It is true that one notes a continuous gradation in the animal series; but between the animal and man there is a solution of continuity. Now, even admitting, which is merely a system, that the Spirit has passed through all the degrees of the animal scale, before arriving at man, there would always be, from one to the other, an interruption that would not exist if the Spirit of the animal could incarnate itself directly in the body of man. If it were so, among the wandering spirits there would be those of animals, as there are human Spirits, which does not happen.

Without entering into the thorough examination of this question, which we shall discuss later, we say, according to the Spirits, who in this are in agreement with the observation of the facts, that no man is the reincarnation of the Spirit of an animal. The animal instincts of man derive from the imperfection of his own Spirit, not yet purified and which, under the influence of matter, gives preponderance to the physical needs over the moral ones and over the moral sense, not yet sufficiently developed. The physical needs being the same in man and in the animal, it necessarily results that, until the moral sense establishes a counterweight, there may be between them a certain analogy of instincts; but there the parity stops; the moral sense, which does not exist in the one, and which in the other germinates and grows incessantly, establishes between them the true line of demarcation.

Another inference no less erroneous is drawn from the principle of the plurality of existences. From their resemblance to certain personages, some conclude that they may have been such personages. Now, from what precedes, it is easy to demonstrate that there exists therein only a chimerical idea. As we have said, the consanguineous relations can produce a similitude of forms, but this is not the case here, for Aesop may later have been a handsome man and Socrates a fine young man: thus, when there is no corporeal filiation, there will be only a fortuitous resemblance, for there is no necessity for the Spirit to inhabit similar bodies and, in taking a new body, it brings no portion of the old one. However, in accordance with what we said above, as to the character that the passions can imprint upon the features, one might think that, if a Spirit has not progressed perceptibly and returns with the same inclinations, it may bring upon the face an identity of expression. This is exact, but it would be at most a family air, and from that to a real resemblance there is a great distance. Moreover, this case must be exceptional, for it is rare that the Spirit does not come in another existence with dispositions perceptibly modified. Thus, from the physiognomic signs one can draw absolutely no indication of the previous existences. We can find them only in the moral character, in the instinctive and intuitive ideas, in the innate inclinations, in those that do not result from education, as well as in the nature of the expiations endured. And even this could only indicate the kind of existence, the character one ought to have, taking into account the progress, but not the individuality. (See The Spirits' Book, numbers 216 and 217). [1] Translator's note: Kardec made use of the scientific theories of the time. Only in 1865 would Mendel publish his first works on genetics, while the DNA molecule, the basis of heredity, was not even dreamed of.